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The Economics of;.·Information·, Market Structure,
and Pricfng in the Securitf es Industry . ·

by William E. Mitchell and· Robert L. Sorensen
I. Introduction
·Traditional microeconomic theory explains the process by which
markets determine
prices, output, and product variety under the simpl ffyi.ng
.
.

assumption that all market participa11ts. possess perfect (costless)
inJormatio1_1.

While it is recognized that,· in fact, fnfonnation is

neither perfect nor costless, ft 1s. commonly assumed that the other
proper-ti es of the model do not depend in any important way on this
condition.

This model predicts that there will be a single _market price

for identical goods in a perfectly competitive market~
Beginning with the seminal article by Stigler (1961}, a theoretical
literature began to energe in the 1970s concerning ·the economics of market
information, which is the study of the microeconomics of producing,
obtaining, and using infonnation about the potential terms of trade in
a market context.

Economics of information models seek to provide

explanations of the adjustment to equilibrium that are lacking in
traditional models.

Hirs,hl eifer (1973) provides a good description

of this field of study:

In these models, it is assumed that buyers

and sellers are uncertain about the market terms of trade of price and
quality characteristics of goods and services.

They are assumed.to have

perfect information about their own resources and opportunities~ bu-t:
are _uncertain (imperfectly informed) about the demand-supply offers of
each other.

Information, which reduces uncertainty, .is produced basically

by buyer search and seller advertising.
sellers-, collectively termed

11

These activities by buyers and

search, 11 provide a- theoretical explanation

of how markets adjust to equil i crium.

Models of market. information

2
can be divided into three different ty.pes:

infol"Rlation about price,

information about quality, and social welfare implications ·of market
information.
The traditional microeconomic nx>del assumes that prices· will be
established and will change in predictable-ways regardless of the existence·
or extent of imperfect information.

Any exogenous shock, such as a change

in the cost of information or entry of

new

firms, into the industry,

sets in motion equilibrating forces that lead toward the competittv·e
equilibrium price.

In contrast, the economics of information models

suggest that the existence of costly information. may fundamentally change
the expected outcomes .of a competitive market. -For example, the monopoly
price.may prevail even in markets with large numbers of small firms
{e.g., Diamond, 1971; Scitovsky, 1950)
and prices may be higher in markets with a large number of sellers
than in markets with fewer sellers (e.g., Salop, 1976; Stiglitz, 1979;
Satterthwaite, 1979). .
.
Moreover, some economics of information models predict that the
predominant equilibrium characteristic of competitive markets is· price
dispersion, not a unique price.

By introducing an adju-stment mechanism,

however, the existence of an equilibrium price dispersion can be explained
by the traditional theoretical framework in the following way:

Although

the competitive pressures of search and advertising would 1ead toward ..
a single price equilibrium, as price differentials narrowed, the gains
from search and advertising would decline •. Since it is never profitable
to become perfectly informed in a world of costly·information, an
equilibrium price distribution for a homogeneous good would obtain at
the point where the net_ gains from additional information are

·zero.

Since

this equilibrium could be consistent with small or large price dispersion, ·
~owever, this is an issue of some importance.

One observer posed' the
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question this way:

Does imperfect information and the friction of ·

disequilibrium make a substantial difference in market outcomes or· does
it merely account 11 for variations in tne numbers we observe at the fifth

or sixth ·decimal place" (Rothschild, 1973, p. 1283). By assuming specific
~ehavioral characteristics of buyers and sellers as they search, some
econoinics of information models predict that, for a variety of reasons~
price dispersion in competitive markets may be large and persistent
(e.g., Salop, 1973; Butters, 1977; Salop and Stiglitz, 1977L ·
This paper concentrates on several aspects of the impact of informati~n
on market price in the retail discount commission brokerage industry.
In ·section II, we describe the characteristics ·of the industry and the
product and,in section III, we .examine the data set and the extent of
pric.e dispersion in this market.

In section IV, we test several hypotheses

about the effect of market structure on pricing behavior by discount
brokerage firms.

II. Industry and Product Characteristics
There are two reasons why the discount brokerage industry provides
an interesting case and a· good set

of data for studying the. impact of

informationally imperfect imarkets on prices.

First, this industry

offers a relatively homogeneous product, which reduces the pro bl em of
adjusting the data for quality differences.

Second, since its

raison ~tre is to offer efficient, low..cost transactions services,
discount brokerage firms publish detailed price information on their
services, which provides a good data set.·
This segment of the securities industry evolved. as a result of
legislation that abpl ished the cartel pricing system in 1975. Most
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retail discount brokerage firms offer a single, relatively standardized .
product called title. transfer,, which i$ just one par1: of total transactions
1
services • In the theoretical model of transacting, .oemsetz (1968)

· 1Full service brokers, such as Merrill Lynch, Bache, and E.F. Hutton,

al so provide a variety of investment advisory services at no additional
. charge. ·Thus, their 11 brokerage 11 commissions, which are substantially
higher than the di~counters, are actually a combination of fees for title
transfer services and fees for investment. advisory services •.
divides transacting into two steps:

a liqu:fdity function, provided by

dealers, and a title transfer function, provided by brokers.

The price

of liquidity, which is the premium paid by persons for "predictable
immediacy of exchange in organized markets" (Demsetz, pp. 35~36), is ·
measured· by the bid-ask spread. The price of title transfer. is measured
by brokerage commissions. 2 There may be particular trades in which

2There are al so minor miscellaneous charges, such as transfer

taxes and certificate delivery fees.

a securities firm assumes both deal er and brokerage :activities, but
they are functions that can be priced separately.
Although brokerage

11 usually defined as bringing buyer and seller•

toegether,. it is more accurate to say that generally the broker brings
buyer and dealer or seller and dealer together.

Thus, brokerage.can

be defined as. an interface service between clients who wish to obtain .
title transfer services and dealers who perform the execution function.
Brokers also function as the interface between their clients and transfer
agents, who handle the actual physical transfer of title. ·
In this study, we assume that brokers are price ta·kers· with respect
to dealer services, so that ·variations in the quality of execution
services is· not an explanation fo.r variations in brokerage commissions.
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The pri~e-taker assumption is certainly true for all H111it orders _that
are placed away from the current market price.

And for.market orders,

the alternative is to assume that brokers either fulfill the dealer
function themselves, so they have some control over quality, or they are
particularly adept at negotiating or searching among dealers for the
best bid-ask prices.

If a firm .was able to offer a title transfer

service that included access to better execution, and if buyers recognized
this fact, that finn could ·charge ~ .preniu,a .for· this higher quality
product. 1 Some brokers claim that they can obtain the best price for

1we are ignoring the potentially more-difficult issues of quality
perception

by buyers, which may be influenced by advertising.

_clients, presumably by searching for dealers_ with the most favorable
bid-ask spread.

But this fact is virtually imposs·•f bl e for the client

to verify. Moreover, it is questionable whether, in fact, brokers search.
The brokerage function itself is 1 imitad to a few relatively .
standardized items:
1 . receive, transmit, and confirm title transfer orders;
2. provide supporting documentation, such as confirmation
and monthly statements;
3. handle the payment. and dispersal of money related to trades;
4. collect and deliver s.ecurities certificates;

·s. ma11age margin accounts and free credit balances;
6. provide custodial services.
Item 1 _represents ~he brokerage function tha.t facilitates execution
of the trade.
function.

Items 2, 3, and 4 are known collectively as the "cl earing"

Money and certificates change hands- between buyers and se11 ers
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through thei.r brokers •1 Items 5 a.nd 6 are ancillary services.

1The s e111 ng broker de1i vers the security to the buying ·br_oker • . ·

(This is accompUshed on a net trading basis by specialized clearing
institutions.). The buying broker sends the c~rtificate to the appropriate
transfer agent (usually a connnercial bank},. who issues a certificate in
_
the name of the new owner. The certificate is then delivered to the
new owner .through the buying broker •.
Discounters and small full service- brokers often contract out one

or more of itens 2-6 to firms. that have excess capacity to handle these,
routine chores.

For example, the most specialized type of discount

broker is the so.-call ed "introducing broker," who actually performs
only one phase of the first function 1 isted above.

This type of firm

receives and transmits orders to another broker who, in turn, directs
them to dealers.

Confirmation is_ then relayed back through the introducing

broker to the client. One or more of the remaining functions are performed
by another firm, often a large full service broker like Merrill Lynch
who, in effect, participates indirectly in the discount brokerage business.
· In summary, there is no reason to believe that there are significant
or systenatic differences in the quality of title transfer services
offered by firms in the retail discount comnission brokerage industry.
Indeed, the smallest firm could contract with a·highly efficient clearing
broker for many of its functions and provide a service equal to or better
in quality than a competitor who is much better. capitalized.

The

product is rendered more homogeneous by the protec1;ion against fraud
or .mismanagement afforded by: Sl?C insuran~e, which is often suppl enented by
individua·l firms with private insurance.
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UI. Pricing Characteristics

·!

In this section, we examine the pricing .Characteristics of a sample of discount
firms. Th~ firms in the sample ·were identified· through a process of ·
searching advertisements in Barron's, _Wall Street Journal, yellow pages
of telephone directories, and lo.cal newspapers.

We obtai.ned price data

and the characteri stf cs of services o.ffered by 68 fJnris that advertised
discount commission rates during 1979.

These firms had home offices

'

.r

or branches in 26 different cities that were geographically separated
enough to be considered independent local market areas.

These markets

. were located throughout the_ United States.
Table 1 provides information on mean price, maximum and minimum
TABLE l
Selected Stathtics for Discount Brokers
Trade

- Adj:~- C"oiff.tcient.
of Variation*

Mean

Minimum

Maximum-

Coeffi c1ent ·
of Variation

19.5%

18.5%

200 shrs.

@

$20

$ 45

$ 30

. $ 70

300 shrs.

@

30

78

37

135

25.4

22.7

400· shrs.

@

40

113

50

224

29.7

26.1-

500 shrs.

@

50

146

62

290

31 .3

28.2

*see

text for details of adjustment procedures
price, coefficient of variation, and adjusted coefficient o.f variation
(discussed below), that where computed from our sample of discount
.

brokers for selected trades.

.

It is evident that a good deal of variation

exists in the commissions charged for the same trade by discount brokers.
The coefficients of variation range from 19.5% to-31 .3% and the maximum
· price exceeds the minimum price by a factor of 2.5 to 4.5 times.

i
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To gain perspective on the significant price dispersion among .
discount brokers, Table 2 presents similar information for a sample of
TABLE ;2
Selected Statistics for Full Service Brokers*
Trade
100 shrs.
1000 shrs.

@

$ 31

@

8

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Coeffi.cient·of
·Variation

$ 63

$ 60

$ 66

2.9%

208

200

225

4. 1

679

3.0

. 3000 shrs • .@ 17
650
606
*source: Survey~•by Kennedy Cabot -Co. 1979
1

full service brokerage firms drawn .from a different sourse •. As
demonstrated by a compariso·n of the data in· Tables 1 and 2, price
di_spersion among discount brokers is 4 to 7 times higher than for full
service brokers.

Full service brokers apparently choose to engage in

nonprice competition through the provision of investment· advisory services,
which are bundled with title transfer services.

1

1Al though it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine why the
pricing structure is dramatically differentfor these two segmen1;s of
the securities ·industry, there ·is one point worth noting. The ·market
structure of the discount brokerage industry ·is more competitive than the
full service segment of the industry. The pricing structures of these
two industries are consistent with Stigler' s (1961 ). proposition regarding
market structure and price dispersion: .Sfnce price dispersion engenders
search, and search cost is a cost of goods sold, which reduces quantity
demanded, firms in industries with monopoly power will find ·;t in their
collective interest to have 1 ess price dispersion.
·
The data in Table 1, however, may only represent "apparent" rather
than "real II price dispersion if the amount of .services (i.e., cost ·Of
, operations) differs among firms.

Since the -firms in· our sam-pl e differ
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to some extent with respect to services offered- in addition to title
transfer, these data constitute an .upward boundary to the amount of actual
price dispersion within the industry.

In order to obtain a tighter

fix on the amount of actual price dispersion, we estimated how much of
-the variation in commission charges could be accounted for by variation
in the range of ancillary services offered among ffnns.
We identified three important services that differed among firms:
.(a) Investment Advisory Services. · Some firms that advertised
discount brokerage commissions also offered investment advisory services,
such as individual security and portfolio analysis, buy and sell
reco11111endati~ns~ and investment newsletters.

This service should raise

their cost of operatfons above those firms· fn the industry that offer
only title transfer services.

Therefore, we ex_pect commission rates

will be higher for firms that offer investment advisory services.
(b) Interest Paid on Free. Credit Balances.

Some firms-pay interest

on idle account balances._ These arrangements usually involve the use
of overnight repurchase agreements with banks or money market mutual _
funds.

Since this is a level of service beyond title transfer, we

expect that firms offering this arrangement would. have higher commission
1
rates.
(c) Branch Offices.

Most of the firms in- our sample operate from

a single location, but some .-of them have established branch offices in
other cities.

This service provides clients with more convenient access

to the firm, but raises the fixed cost of operations.

We expect.that

firms with branch offices wi11 haYe higher commission rates.
Equation (l) represents the form of the regression estimated to

1rt is not cl ear that providing this service will actually raise the cos-t
of operations to the firm, since the firm may rec~ive services in_ kind or
fees for directing customers balances to a particular bank or mutual fund.
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account for the foregoing factors:
·. (1) COMi = ao + a1ADV + a2INT + a3BR + e
where:
conmission charged by firms for trades fn Table 1 (1 = 1,4);.

COM;

a

ADV

= a dunnny variable with value of 1 ff finn offers investment
advisory service, otherwise O;

INT = a. du11111y variable with value of 1 · if firms provide for · ·
interest on free credit ·balances, otherwise O; ·
BR

= a dunmy variable wfth·va·lue of 1 if firm operates branch
offices, otherwise

o.

The results of the regressions. are reported in Table 3. · In general, ·

TABLE3
Regressions Explaining Commission Levels
.(t values in parentheses)
·
.

INTERCEPT

ADV

INT

BR

. R2"'""

COM2

· 45 .o
(28.3)*

5.57
-2.16
(1.99)* (0.99)

4.26
(1.05)

.10

COM3

75 .4
(22 .5)*

19.95
-4.23
(3.23)*. (0.92)

17.73
(2.08)*

.20

COM4 ·

109.7
(19. 7)*

38.5
-9.60
{3.75)* (1.20)

20.15
,(L82)*

.23

142. 8

48.15 -13.19
(3. 37)* (1 .23)

COMs·

(18.5)*

17.29

.20

( 0 .98).

*significant
.
at .05 level or better
** adjusted for degrees of freedom
the coefficients on the variables are of the expected sign, and many
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better.

The coefficient

for the advisory service variable is positive, as expected, and significant
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. in all of the equations~ The coefficients for the branching vari.abl e
al so have the .expected positive signs and are significant in two of the
four equa-tions.

Finally, the coefficient for the interest rate variable

is negative, _but 1s· not significant in any of· the· equations.
I

Most important for present purposes 1s the amount of observed price
dispersion that can be accounted for by the differences in firm characteristics •
. The residual variance left unexplained by the regression is given by
2
2
(1 - R ), wher~ R is the coefficient .of determination of the regression
Thus, the percentage reduction in the standard error due to
the regression -can be calculated as l - ~ (1 - R2 ). Applying this adjustment
equation.

factor to each of the trades 1 isted in Table l yielded the adjusted
coefficients of variation given in column 5 of that Table. While speci fie
firm characteristics account for some of the variation in prices among
discount brokers, substantial price dispersion remains even after adjustment.
The preceding analysis implicitly assumed that the market for
discount brokerage services is national fn scope.

But if the relevant

market 1s local, then some of the observed price dispersion may reflect
differences in spatially separated markets that are not arbitraged away.
While, in principle, there is nothing to prevent a client from dealing
with a broker in any area of the country (most firms offer free WATS
service), there are reasons to believe that, to some extent, the relevant
market for brokerage services is. local.

First, the existence of branching

by some discount brokers suggests that these firms believe it is important
to have offices close to the potential customer base.

Second, clients

may prefer to deal with local brokers to take advantage of such facilities.
as stock quotation machines and 1 ibrary materials that are provided
in the broker's office.

Finally, .c.1 ients may feel that dealing with a

local broker will expedite the solut.ion to any problems that arise,
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such as incorrect execution or- errors on monthly statements.
In order to investigate the impact of ·geographical differences on
the observed 1evel of price dispersion, the _firms and branch offices
.

.

.

were sorted .by location of the city fn which they operated.

Since

the firms that offer investment advisory services were found to have '
significantly different prices from those that do not, they were dropped
from· the sample. - Then, for each city location, the mean price and
coefficient of variation were calculated within the c.ity for various
trades.

The results of these cal cul at ions are presented in Table 4.

It is evident that, even within individual cities, substa·ntial variation
still reriains for -comm-issions charged for the same transaction.

We

conclude that the price dispersion observ·ed for the complete s~mpl e is
not simply a statistical artifact

·1v.

of spatially separated market$.

Information, Competition, and Prices

The analysis so far has indicated that a substantial amount of
price dispersion exists for co11111ission charges of discount brokers. Since "price dispersion is a manifestation-and, indeed, it is· the
measure--of ignorance in the market (Stigler, 1961, p. 214), we conclude
that the discount brokerage industry is characterized by imper-feet
buyer information.

We now turn to a test of some of the hypotheses

about the role of competition under conditions· of imperfect information.
Standard microeconomic theory general 1y associates price competition
with the number of firms in an industry.

Increases in th_e number of

firms through entry is expected to lower the industry equilibrium price .
. Under conditions of costly or imperfect information, however, this_
conclusion does not necessarily obtain; increases in the number of
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TABLE 4 .

~

Mean Price

Co~fffc1~nt of_ Variation :·

COM2
New York ·
Boston·
Phi 1adel phi a
Washington D.C.
Houston
Rochester
Chicago
· - St Louis
Cleveland
Cincinnati
Miami
Memphis
Atlanta
San Franci sea
Los Angeles
Phoenix
Dallas

COM3

19. l 27.8_
17.8 31.1
6.0 _13.3
8.3
6.0

COM4

30.9
43.3
15.0
17 .1
a.a· a.a -· 10.1
3.0
5.3
4.9·
12. 3 15.3 22.2
1.4
0.7
0.9
24.6 23.6 _ 23.S
10.2 _ 3.2 18.5
16.4 11.T 16.0
13.5
7.2
0.0
24.6 18.8 18.3
13.5 12.3 21.6
7.5
9.9 14.2.
6.9
9.5 29.3
a.a 0.8 18.7

COMS
32.2
53.5
18.7
24 •.2 ·
17 .5
5.9
27 .3 .
0.6
12.6
29.5

27.7
0.0
18.5
19.3
16.5
25.4

17.5

-

.

COM2

COM3

$42
43
51
51

$70
65

48

54

44

·so
46
62
47 42
46
48

46
50
48

88

94
89
l 01
79
75
90
110
.:.:. ·82
79
86
91
87
95
89

COM4

COMS

- $102 . $128
125
91
·11.30
175
181
136
133
106
159
203
106
140 ·
100 -110 _
1_41
179
156 ·202
150
120
163
118
187
135
127 - 157
143
110
126 · 154
133
106
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firms within _the industry mayac:t to raise rather than lower the
equilibrium price •.
This seemingly paradoxical conclusion arises· because of the interaction
between the number of firms. and the efficiency o.f search (Sal op~ 1976;
Satterthwaite, 1979).

More specifically, an increase in-the .number of

firms acts to increase the effective search cost. of buyers. _·If buyers
search in a·n optimal fashion, then an increase in the.·cost of search.
wil 1 result in a reduction in the amount of search undertaken.

The

effect of Jess buyer search is to reduce· the el a·sticity of .demand facing
the individual firm, which implies a higher equilibrium price •..Thus,
. increases in the number of firms has two counterveil ing effects:- th_e
usual effect of increasing consumer choice and. reducing prices, and the
effect of reduced information on the elasticity of firm demand •. Therefore,
"the net effect of increased competition may b~ either to raise or lower
prices 1' (Sal op, 1976, _p. 245).
An empirical test of these propositions can be made within the
context of pricing in the discount brokerage industry.

If increases

in the number of firms increases effective search cost and reduces the
intensity of search, then markets with larger numbers of firms should
exhibit greater amounts of price dispersion.
.

In addition, if the effects

I

of increased search cost outweigh the normal effects of entry, then mean
prices should -be higher in markets that have greater numbers of firms.
In order to test these proposition_s, we examine the relationship
between the number of firms within each city in our sample and the
resulting coefficient of variation of prices and mean price. ·The
coefficient of variation is taken to measure the intensity of search,
since greater amounts of search should reduce the allowable dispersion

15
. of ·prices.

1

The mean price is taken to measure the equilibrium·price

1

It is important to note that we are working with quoted prices
rather than transaction.prices. While, as Rothschild (1974, p. 692)
notes. "It should turn out in most sensible models that increased ·search
activity w111 · decrease price dispersion," o.ur statement is .not on as
theoretically sol id g"unds as the proposition that increased search
from an unchanging distribution of prices lowers the mean and variat'ion
of transaction prices.
·
within each city.
Table 5 presents the results far regression equations across cities
TABLE 5

_Regressions for Price D.ispersion A~ross Cities
(t values in parentheses)

.

INTERCEPT

NFR

S.IER

Rz'"'

CVC0M2

16.8
· (5 .87}*

.46
(1.99)*

- .13
(3.69)*

.46

CVC0M3

14.8
(4.60)

.-87
{3.28)*

-.11
(2.99)*

.48

17.8iil

.76
(1.80)*

-.04

.10

(0.73)

~

CVC0M4

(3.59)*

CVC0MS

18.6
.84
(1.67)
(3.04)*
*significant at .• 05 level or better
~adjusted for degrees of freedom

-.03
(0.45)

.06

in which the dependent variahl e is the city 1 s· coefficient of variation ·
of prices (CVCOM).

The equation contains two independent variables.

The first is the number of firms operating -~ithin the city (NFR).

If

increases in the number of firms does result in higher search cost and
1ess. intensity of search, then the coefficient for this variable ought
to be positive.

The second variable is an .index ·to reflect the similarity
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of firms within each city with respect to the branching characteristic
(SIMBR). · Since firms with branch offices were previously found to
typically charge higher prices, some of the variation in prices within
cities could be attributable to differing mixes of branch and nonbranching firms.
hundred.

The index is designed to vary between zero and one

It reaches its. maximum value when all the firms within.a. city

are identical with respect to the bra-nching characteristic (i.e., none
of the firms are branch.firms or all of the firms a·re branch firms).
It reaches a value of zero when there is maximum dis-similarity of firms
with respect to branching (i.e., 50% of the firms are branch firms and

..

. soi

are not).

Since the greater the similarity of firms with respect

to branching the less dispersion we expect, the coefficient for this

.

variable should be negative.

1

1specifically, this variable is calculated as two times the absolute
va 1ue of 50 mi nus the percentage of firms that are branches.
The results shown in Ta·bl e 5 conform to the theoretical expectations_
of some economics of information models.

The coefficient for the number

of firms variable is positive and significant at the 5% 1evel or better
in three of the four equations.

The coefficient for the similarity of

branching is always negative~ as expected, and is significant in two of
the four equations.

These results are consistent with the notion that

increases in the number of firms raises effective search cost and reduces
the intensity of search.
Does this imply that the net effect of increasing competition is
to raise· mean prices?

Table 6 presents regression equations across

17

cities in which the city's mean price fs the dependent variable (MCOM).

TABLE 6
Regressions for Mean Prices Across- Cities :
(t values in parentheses)

INTERCEPT

NFR

MCOM2

48.6
(25.7)*

n·: 76)*

--r287

.017
{0.80)

.1 a.

MCOM3

81.8
(23.,5)*

-.525

.123
{2.98)*

.38

{1 .85)*

118.6
(15.1)*

.141
(1.52}

.15

(1 ._27)

151.9
(12.0)*

-1.172
(0.97}

.207

., a

( 1. 39)

MCOMf

MCOMS
--·- ,,.,_ .._ -~-- . -"

-.877

PERBR

-~-- ·-·

* significant at .05 level or better
_**adjusted for degrees of freedom

Each equation. contains two -independent variables.

The first variable

is the number of firms operating within -each city.

If price competition

is actually impaired by large numbers of firms, then the coefficient
for this variable ought to be positive.

The second variable is the

percentage of firms within each city that are branching firms (PERBR).
Since branch:fng firms have· higher prices in general, it is expected that
the greater the percentage of firms in a city that are branches, the
higher will be that city's mean prices.
The results shown in Table 6 give no indication that the net effect
of increased competition is to raise rather than lower prices.

The

coefficients on the number of firms variable are consistently negative
and significant in two of the four equations.

The effects of competition
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predicted by standar~ microeconomic theory seem to .obtain.· The branching
variable is positive, as expected,. but is significant in only one of
the four equations.

V.

Summary and Conclusions

This paper has investigated the pricing behavior of discount ·
brokerage firms.

One striki.ng characteristic of this indus.try i.s

the significant amount of pr;-ce dispersion that exists for commissions
charged for identical transactions.

The fact that this cannot be

be explained by differences in the service offerings of finns or
imperfectly·arbitraged spatial markets suggests that this is an
information based phenomenom.

Using th·e observed price dispersion

within cities as a measure .of· the degree of consumer ignorance several
hypotheses about the fnteracti on of information and competition were
exami ned.

The res u1 ts obtained a re· consistent wi th the theo reti ca 1

notion that competition (as measured by numbers of f.irms) increases
effective search cost and reduces the intensity of search.

Nonetheless,

the net effect of increased competition was found to lowe.r rather than
raise prices.
The results of this study of course must be considered tentative.
Not all aspects of the consumer information acquisitfun process- were
taken into account nor the behavior of sellers in providing information
(e.g,, advertising).

Despite these shortcomings, the results presented

here suggest that i nfonnation does play a quantitatively important role
in influenci-ng pricing outcomes within the discount br.okerage industry.
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